The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations by Bertels, Christie & Dittermore, Gary
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
1 
The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of 
Flight Controller Training Methods for 
Space Shuttle Mission Operations 
Gary Dittemore1 and Christie Bertels2
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 77586 
 
Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex; therefore, the training and 
certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission 
Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, 
manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and 
certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. An overview of a flight control 
team’s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams are 
trained and certified, reveals that—while the training methodology for developing flight 
controllers has evolved significantly over the last thirty years—the core goals and 
competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control 
center have evolved. Changes in methodology and tools have been driven by many factors, 
including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and 
generational differences. Flight controllers share their experiences in training and operating 
the space shuttle. The primary training method throughout the program has been  mission 
simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly “train like you fly.” A review of 
lessons learned from flight controller training suggests how they could be applied to future 
human spaceflight endeavors, including missions to the moon or to Mars. The lessons 
learned from operating the space shuttle for over thirty years will help the space industry 
build the next human transport space vehicle. 
I. Introduction 
OR 30 years, NASA’s Space Transportation System (STS), also known as the shuttle program, was the United 
States’ launch vehicle for the human spaceflight program. With the last shuttle launch on July 8, 2011, NASA is 
exploring alternatives for future launch vehicles; attention to lessons learned during the shuttle program will serve 
NASA well in making its launch vehicle decision. Therefore, it is timely to review and assess an essential aspect of 
the STS program: training and certification of operations personnel. 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) is the center for human spaceflight training, research, and flight control. The daily 
operation of the space shuttle has been conducted at the JSC Mission Control Center (MCC-) in Houston, Texas. 
The main task of an MCC is to manage space missions, from lift-off until the landing or the end of the mission. 
Flight controllers, flight crew, and other support personnel provide real-time support of all aspects of the mission, 
including vehicle telemetry monitoring, commanding, mission planning, and trajectory design. MCC personnel 
include operations subject matter experts for the attitude control system, power, propulsion, thermal, attitude 
dynamics, orbital operations, and other subsystem disciplines.1 Each controller is an expert in a specific technical 
area, and is in constant communication with additional experts.  
Training and certification of operations personnel are critical elements in mission success. Training for human 
spaceflight missions usually falls under the responsibility of dedicated training personnel. The flight controller and 
mission crew training typically includes extensive rehearsals in the MCC called simulations (also known as “sims”). 
A review of training methods and simulations developed over the 30-year shuttle program, as well as related lessons 
learned, can help NASA plan for the next era of human spaceflight. 
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Figure 1:Console locations in the MCC are identified by number. 3 
1. Public Affairs Officer (PAO) 
2. Mission Operations Directorate Manager (MOD) 
3. Booster Systems Engineer (BOOSTER) and External Vehicle Activity 
Officer (EVA) 
4. Surgeon (SURGEON) 
5. Integrated Communications Officer (INCO) 
6. Flight Director (FLIGHT)  
7. Spacecraft Communicator (CAPCOM)  
8. Payload Deployment and Retrieval System (PDRS) 
9. Data Processing System Engineer (DPS) 
10. Assembly and Checkout Officer (ACO) 
11. Flight Activities Officer (FAO) 
12. Electrical, Environmental, and Consumables Manager (EECOM) 
13. Propulsion Engineer (PROP) 
14. Guidance, Navigation, and Controls Systems Engineer (GNC) 
15. Maintenance, Mechanical, Arm, and Crew Systems (MMACS) 
16. Electrical Generation and Illumination Engineer (EGIL) 
17. Flight Dynamics Officer (FDO) and Trajectory Officer (TRAJ) 
18. Guidance and Procedures Officer (GPO) or Rendezvous (RNDZ) 
19. Ground Controller (GC) 
20. Worldmap Screen 
21. TV Screen 
22.  Mission Clocks/Telemetry Data 
Image courtesy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.  
 
II. The Mission Control Room 
Before the space shuttle program began, the room where the flight controllers worked was called the Mission 
Operations Control Room (MOCR); for the last three decades it has been called the Flight Control Room (FCR). A 
description of the control room layout and the responsibilities of each participant sets the stage for understanding the 
complexity of each subsystem role, the importance of effective flight controller training, and how the training is 
implemented in the human flight program.  
The FCR has four rows of consoles; each console is dedicated to a specific area of expertise. Each console is 
labeled with an abbreviation that clearly identifies the responsibility. MCC seat assignments are shown in Figure 1; 
Table 1 describes controller roles and responsibilities. 
Every flight controller is a 
subject matter expert in his or 
her system and makes 
recommendations about the 
system to the flight director.  
Any controller may call for an 
abort if certain flight rules are 
violated or if circumstances 
require an abort to keep the crew 
and vehicle safe. Before major 
mission events (such as an on-
orbit space burn) in the flight 
plan take place, the flight 
director "goes around the room" 
to  poll each subsystem for a 
GO/NO-GO decision. If the 
subsystem is in good working 
order, the responsible controller 
calls for a GO, but if there is a 
problem in a subsystem, the 
responsible controller’s call is 
NO GO, and the flight director 
holds or aborts the event.2 
Space shuttle flight 
controllers work relatively brief 
periods, especially compared to 
their International Space Station 
(ISS) counterparts: the several 
minutes of ascent, the few days 
the vehicle is in orbit, and 
reentry. The duration of 
operations for space shuttle 
flight controllers is short and 
time-critical. A failure on a 
critical phase of the shuttle flight 
could leave flight controllers 
little time for decision making, 
so it is essential that they 
respond quickly to mitigate 
potential failures. The 
controller’s ability to send 
commands to the shuttle for 
system reconfigurations is 
limited; if a reconfiguration is 
needed, then the desired 
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configuration is relayed via the subsystem controller to the spacecraft communicator (CAPCOM) and then to the 
shuttle crew.  
Flight controllers feel very responsible for the success of the mission and for the lives of the astronauts under 
their watch. There is a phrase often heard in the FCR: “Always be aware that suddenly and unexpectedly we may 
find ourselves in a role where our performance has ultimate consequences.”  
 
Table 1. Mission Operations Control Room Team: Roles and Responsibilities During Flight.3 
 
Role Console 
Label  
Position (cf 
Fig. 1)* 
Responsibility 
Assembly and 
Checkout Officer  
ACO 10 Develops ISS assembly, activation and checkout operations, 
including the responsibility for any required integrated 
procedures. Coordinates these activities in real-time.  
Coordinates payload and transfer operations. Responsible for ISS 
visiting vehicle  systems integration, safety, and all docked 
operations, including  transfer operations, plans, procedures, and 
systems commanding and telemetry.ACO was formerly known as 
PAYLOADS.  
Booster 
Systems 
Engineer 
BOOSTER 3 Monitors and evaluates performance of propulsion-related 
aspects of the launch vehicle during prelaunch and ascent, 
including the main engines and solid rocket boosters. 
Data Processing 
System 
Engineer 
DPS 9 Responsible for data processing systems in a space flight. 
Monitors the onboard general-purpose computers , flight-critical 
launch and payload data buses, the multi-function electronic 
display system, solid-state mass memory units, flight-critical and 
payload multiplexer/de-multiplexer units, master timing unit, 
backup flight control units, and system-level software. The space 
shuttle general-purpose computers are a critical subsystem, and 
the vehicle cannot fly without them. 
Electrical, 
Environmental, 
and 
Consumables 
Manager 
EECOM 12 Maintains atmospheric pressure control and revitalization 
systems, cooling systems (air, water, and freon), and 
supply/waste water system. EECOM's critical function is to 
maintain the systems, such as atmosphere and thermal control, 
that keep the crew alive. 
Electrical 
Generation and 
Illumination 
Engineer 
EGIL 16 Monitors cryogenic levels for the fuel cells, electrical generation, 
and distribution systems on the spacecraft, as well as vehicle 
lighting. This is a portion of the job was formerly done by 
EECOM. 
Extravehicular 
Activity Officer 
EVA  Responsible for all spacesuit and spacewalking–related tasks, 
equipment, and plans when the EVA takes place from the shuttle. 
The EVA officer shares a console with BOOSTER. EVA uses the 
console during the orbit phase of  the flight. 
Flight Activities 
Officer  
FAO 11 Coordinates implementation of the flight plan and develops 
alternate and flight plans, as required. Provides the capability to 
transfer data (text, graphics, and video) between a ground PC 
network and the orbiter laptops. 
Flight Director FLIGHT 6 Provides overall management and authority for flight execution. 
Responsible for the detailed control of the mission, from 
prelaunch until post landing.   
Flight Dynamics 
Officer  
FDO  17 Responsible for the flight path of the space shuttle, both 
atmospheric and orbital. Monitors vehicle performance during the 
powered flight phase and assesses abort modes, calculates 
orbital maneuvers and resulting trajectories, and monitors vehicle 
flight profile and energy levels during re-entry. The FDO and 
TRAJ share a console in the MCC. 
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Role Console 
Label  
Position (cf 
Fig. 1)* 
Responsibility 
Ground 
Controller 
GC 19 Directs maintenance and operation activities affecting MCC 
hardware, software, and support facilities. Coordinates 
spaceflight tracking and data network. CoordinatesTracking and 
Data Relay Satellite System with Goddard Space Flight Center.  
Guidance and 
Procedures 
Officer 
GPO 18 Depending on the phase of flight the mission is in, position 18 is 
either staffed by GPO (a specialist in the procedures related to 
flight or RNDZ (a specialist in orbital rendezvous procedures). 
GPO is responsible for monitoring the Shuttle guidance and 
navigation as well as execution of crew procedures, particularly 
for ascent abort situations. 
Guidance, 
Navigation, and 
Controls 
Systems 
Engineer 
GNC 14 Responsible for operating and monitoring the sensor system, 
which includes navigation sensors and associated software. 
Responsible for  flight control system hardware and software, 
which includes aero and reaction control system controls, digital 
autopilots, main engines, solid rocket boosters, and orbital 
maneuvering system thrust vector control with associated 
software.  
Integrated 
Communications 
Officer  
INCO 5 Responsible for all data, voice and video communications 
systems. Monitors the configuration of in-flight communications 
and instrumentation systems. Monitors the telemetry link between 
the vehicle and the ground. Oversees the uplink command and 
control processes. This position evolved directly from the Apollo 
program Integrated Communications Officer role. 
Maintenance, 
Mechanical, 
Arm, and Crew 
Systems  
MMACS 15 Responsible for space shuttle structural and mechanical systems. 
Monitors auxiliary power units and hydraulic systems. Manages 
payload bay door, external tank umbilical door, vent door, radiator 
deploy/stow, Ku-band antenna deploy/stow, and payload 
retention latch operations, landing gear/deceleration systems 
(landing gear deploy, tires, brakes/antiskid, and drag chute 
deploy).Monitors the orbiter docking system. Tracks use of 
onboard crew hardware and in-flight equipment maintenance. 
This represents aportion of the job formerly done by EECOM, 
with additional responsibilities added by the specific requirements 
of space shuttle operations. The MMACS officer serves as the 
point of contact for PDRS, BOOSTER, and EVA during periods in 
a mission when these positions do not require constant staffing. 
Mission 
Operations 
Directorate 
Manager 
MOD 2 Serves as an upper management interface to the flight operations 
team.  
Payload 
Deployment and 
Retrieval 
System  
PDRS 8 Responsible for space shuttle remote manipulator system, also 
known as "robot arm." 
Propulsion 
Engineer  
PROP 13 Manages the reaction control thrusters and orbital maneuvering 
engines during all phases of flight. Monitors fuel usage and 
propellant tank status. Calculates optimal sequences for thruster 
firings. 
Public Affairs 
Officer 
PAO 1 Serves as a liaison between the public information media and the 
flight operations team. 
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Role Console 
Label  
Position (cf 
Fig. 1)* 
Responsibility 
Rendezvous  RNDZ 18 Depending on the phase of flight the mission is in, position 18 is 
either staffed by GPO (a specialist in the procedures related to 
flight or RNDZ (a specialist in orbital rendezvous procedures). 
RNDZ is.responsible for activities such as trajectory operations 
related to the rendezvous and docking/capture with another 
spacecraft, including the Mir space station, ISS, and satellites 
such as the Hubble Space Telescope.  
Spacecraft 
Communicator 
CAPCOM 7 Provides air-to-ground communication between the flight crew 
members and ground support team. Ensures that ground 
recommendations regarding vehicle maintenance and control are 
transmitted clearly and appropriately to the crew. 
Surgeon SURGEON 4 Provides real-time medical consultation on issues related to flight 
crew member health and safety. 
Trajectory 
Officer  
TRAJ 17 Assists the FDO during time-critical operations. Maintains the 
various processors that help determine the shuttle's current and 
potential trajectories. A controller who wants to become a flight 
dynamics officer must first be certified as a trajectory officer. The 
FDO and TRAJ share a console in the MCC. 
* Note: Mission Clocks/Telemetry Data (22 in Figure 1), TV Screen (21), World Map Screen (20), are not flight 
controller positions 
III. Training Pre-Challenger 
A. Evolving Processes: From Workbooks to Simulations 
NASA began space shuttle flight controller training in the late 1970s, years before the first shuttle launch. This 
training involved a variety of tasks intended to build vehicle system expertise and core flight control skills, which 
had evolved from previous human spaceflight programs such as Gemini and Apollo.4 Because the shuttle design was 
not yet stable, shuttle operations practices were evolving rapidly, and flight controllers by necessity developed the 
operations documentation as they learned the systems. Early training primarily involved reading workbooks on 
different systems and pieces of hardware. Occasionally a flight controller would research a piece of hardware and 
present the findings to the group as a lecture. Office time was spent studying and working on operational documents 
to help the flight controller prepare for simulations.‡
Shuttle flight simulations began approximately 1 year prior to the first launch (as originally scheduled in 1978). 
However, as the launch was delayed several times, the STS-1 teams had several years and hundreds of hours of 
simulations prior to the actual launch.
 Additionally, flight controllers developed and reviewed crew 
procedures, flight rules, system drawings, and malfunction procedures; these documents in turn became the primary 
training materials used in simulations. Flight controllers supported operations boards, project meetings, and program 
meetings. They coordinated, reviewed, and dispositioned the many hardware and software changes that occurred on 
a weekly basis. As basic console operations were established, console positions identified, and support positions 
staffed, the simulations revealed weaknesses in console operations that had to be fixed. Every day required attention 
to changes and preparation for future simulations. 
§
Ascent and entry teams conducted 6-hour simulations weekly to test the flight controllers on console. Flight 
phases were defined the same as they are today: The ascent phase of lift begins at liftoff and continues until the 
vehicle is in a safe low-Earth orbit (LEO) or until an abort landing is achieved. The orbit phase of flight begins after 
the vehicle is in a safe orbit and lasts until preparation for re-entry back to Earth. The entry phase of flight starts 
from the in-space de-orbit burn and ends with space shuttle touchdown.5 The ascent and entry phases of flight 
require more training time because there is very little time, on the order of seconds, to make real-time decisions. .In 
comparison, the orbit phase allows more time, on the order of minutes or hours, to make decisions because the 
 Participants in these simulations staffed consoles in the MCC that were 
connected to a shuttle vehicle simulator. The simulations executed a piece of the mission timeline, and allowed 
flight controllers to execute procedures, and respond to malfunctions. The malfunctions were inserted by instructors 
to evaluate flight controller performance. 
                                                          
‡ R. Dittemore, personal communication, April 4, 2011 
§ W. Hale, personal communication, May 10, 2011 
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vehicle systems are less dynamic and allow more time to analyze failures or anomalies. As a result, less intense 
training is required for the orbit phase. 
Early in the space shuttle program there were no software tools to assist in flight controller decisionmaking.** 
The information available was read from basic: displays of data and “advisory lights” that represented binary 
information; the operator had to identify and interpret the information quickly. These initial displays were based on 
Apollo telemetry requirements, and each display provided specific and limited insight to the vehicle systems. 
Multiple displays (data/plots) were needed to decipher and troubleshoot data. Console operations involved intensive 
data review, both real time and non–real time. During early missions, real-time telemetry was available for only 
brief periods of orbit time until the constellation of Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS) was developed to 
provide nearly continuous data.††
Even in the very early days of shuttle training, instructors developed simulations to “stretch” the console 
operators’ knowledge and to identify weaknesses in procedures, flight rules, and mission plan. Simulations explored 
the way the flight system truly behaved, which sometimes differed from the original intentions of the spacecraft 
designers. The degree of difficulty varied depending upon the simulation objectives; operators could not be certified 
unless they were able to handle the full range of scenarios.
 
‡‡
These simulations also uncovered issues that vehicle testing and certification had missed. For example, in an 
April 19, 1999 simulation, Backup Flight Software (BFS) took control of the space shuttle as planned, but an 
unexpectedly high pitch rate resulted. The vehicle pitched up over 360 degrees before operators could regain 
control. The simulation was rerun several times and the problem was reproduced. This BFS issue was corrected on 
the flight vehicles, and simulation data validated this change. Failures were welcome during training, as they 
indicated that the simulation hardware and software sufficiently stressed the system. “Crashes” were common in 
early simulations and sometimes the simulation efficacy was questionable. Simulations evolved and became more 
complex as the systems and software were better understood. As in any integrated system, the software was the most 
difficult part of the equation, with heavy demands on time, effort, and resources.
 The instructors also developed simulations that would 
stress the hardware and software system to help the team understand how the system would react in specific flight 
phases. This sometimes differed from the original intentions of the spacecraft designers 
§§
Although simulation schedules varied in the 1970s, simulations were usually held once or twice a week to 
accommodate the continuous systems development. By 1983, simulations were being held every day because the 
simulator had been sufficiently developed to handle the rigors of a daily run.6 Additionally, the mission manifest had 
grown, and more certified individuals were needed in a variety of positions to support multiple missions. 
  
B. Training and Certification Standards 
At the beginning of the shuttle program and into the late 1980s, there were no set standards for training or 
certification. In addition to there being no set standards for training, there was no minimum number of simulations 
required for certification Controllers studied the systems, developed documentation, and participated in simulations 
to learn how to operate the shuttle.***
The basic qualifications for flight controllers were talent and skill in communication, failure recognition, and 
leadership, as well as an ability to handle the fast pace and stress of the operations environment. The flight 
controllers were evaluated on seven main categories. Mission cognizance deals with maintaining “big picture” 
awareness of the shuttle vehicle configuration and prioritizing discipline activities. Systems knowledge deals with 
understanding how to maintain and operate the vehicle efficiently with respect to current conditions. Problem 
recognition and resolution tests the knowledge of the existence of a problem, and the ability to diagnose and develop 
multiple solution options along with appropriate rationale. Console management testing involves understanding the 
limits of the console tools and appropriate use during different phases of flight. Communication is evaluated on 
timeliness of response, clarity, proactivness, and accuracy. Team management involves the trainee’s ability to accept 
or give direction, balance work load, and prioritize team tasks. Attitude/effort assesses the trainee’s honesty, how he 
or she deals with difficult situations, and whether or not full effort is made.  
 
Mission-specific simulations are conducted each flight to allow the crew and flight control teams to practice 
various parts of the mission timeline before a flight. These mission-specific simulations are very different from 
generic training simulations. The generic simulations are filled with multiple malfunctions to test and train 
                                                          
** R. Dittemore, personal communication, April 4, 2011 
†† T. Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 2011 
‡‡ W. Hale, personal communication, May 10, 2011 
§§ R. Dittemore, personal communication, April 4, 2011 
*** T. Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 2011 
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Figure 2. 1980s-era MCC (Courtesy NASA) 
Figure 3. Current MCC (Courtesy NASA) 
uncertified flight controllers. Initially, flight controllers were trained in generic simulations for “backroom” 
positions—system-specific experts responsible for the details of their assigned systems. The backroom in the 
mission control room is called the multi-purpose support room (MPSR). The backroom positions (MPSR) were the 
training positions used to first introduce the operations principles to new hires and new console operators. The 
expectation was that as personnel learned more about shuttle operations and attained a MPSR certification, they 
would then move to front control room (FCR) positions, where operators are responsible for appropriately 
integrating their systems’ requirements with other system operators.5 Additionally, the FCR position was responsible 
for providing a plan, operational changes, and recommendations to the Flight Director.†††
When a controller finished the training for a certain position, a final evaluation simulation was scheduled. In the 
final evaluation for certification, the individual was presented with multiple failures and complex situations. The 
final simulation was a onetime case with more failures than would occur in real time operations or generic 
simulations. These evaluations were conducted by senior experienced flight controllers. If in the judgment of the 
senior flight controllers the trainees performed well and met the category objectives listed above, they were 
considered to be certified. Over time, evaluation criteria were established for certification, and evaluators would 
formally assess each candidate against these criteria to complete the certification process. Many controllers came up 
with their own ways to recall information on console. For example, some controllers developed a set of “cue cards” 
that helped them remember specific flight phase characteristics, timelines, and other critical information. As more 
and more people developed individual sets, the operations team identified the best cue cards, which were formalized 
and became part of the training.
  
‡‡‡
IV. Training Improvements in the 1990s 
 
Over the years, there were many catalysts for change in the shuttle operations environment, which in turn 
improved flight controller training: lessons were learned from experience and practices adjusted accordingly; 
software improvements provided greater details into 
down linked data from the shuttle; operations moved to a 
new control center; and the two space shuttle accidents 
initiated changes in nearly every aspect of shuttle 
operations. 
A. After the Challenger Accident 
After the Challenger accident in 1987, there was a 
down period for training simulations. The Challenger 
accident resulted in an in-depth review of all flight phase 
operations, procedures, and flight rules to ensure 
operational rigor. New flight rules were written and 
procedures were revised, which resulted in simulations 
becoming more complex. The review period also allowed 
time for a more formal training process to be formulated. 
Development started on a training guide, today called the 
“blue book,” and detailed training flows were created. 
Instructor-led technical classes were created to 
supplement the workbooks, with topics ranging from 
hardware to crew procedures. Shuttle onboard software 
was updated to be more efficient and help with failure 
scenarios.§§§
The transition to a new MCC facility (Figure 3) 
occurred in the mid 1990s. The control center provided 
modernized hardware and software, with an increase in 
the number of available displays, communication 
resources, data availability, playback, and data plotting. 
 Additional desktop computers were also 
added to the MCC to augment display data (Figure 2). 
                                                          
††† T. Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 2011 
‡‡‡ R. Dittemore, personal communication, April 4, 2011 
§§§ T.Ceccacci, personal communication, May 11, 2011 
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Communication panels, which flight controllers used to talk to each other on “voice loops,” changed from back-
lighted mechanical push buttons to programmable touch screens.5 Display capability was greatly increased. Instead 
of viewing data from a few screens, each flight controller could access a variety of software programs to display 
more data in the optimal configuration. This additional data insight made failure diagnosis much easier. 
Training for shuttle flight controllers continued in the previously described manner until the 1990s, when 
training was formalized to accommodate an influx of shuttle flight controllers. The blue book created for each 
subsystem streamlined the training process. In addition, new technology was brought into the training process. 
Computers became more readily available; no longer did five or more people share one computer. Shuttle mock-ups, 
called single-system trainers (SST), had been created in the early 1980s to help controllers understand what the 
astronauts were doing as the controllers executed certain procedures. The SSTs contained computer databases with 
software allowing students to interact with controls and displays like those of a shuttle crew station. This was a 
significant contribution to training at the time, but it was not until the 1990s that the SST software was made 
available at the controllers’ individual computers. Also in the 1990s, more computer-based training was being 
introduced to the flight controllers. An additional improvement was creation of a flight controller trainer (FCT), a 
mini mission control room that could be used to teach system failure recognition prior to entering the simulation 
environment. The FCT was also used to train multiple operations personnel as if they were working in the mission 
control room together.7  
As the shuttle training program matured, it took longer for people to become certified. Over the course of the 
program, the number of simulations required to certify each person increased steadily. It is unclear why this is so, 
since one might predict that certification would take less time as shuttle operations practices matured. One 
possibility is that the problem resolution skills and systems knowledge needed to get certified continued to expand 
as more became known about the system and complexity of procedures and rules increased. It became very difficult 
for some systems disciplines to reduce the certification requirements, even after flying the shuttles for 20 years. 
Some failures were being simulated without full understanding of how the system might perform, as if the shuttle 
were still in the early stages of development. It is also possible that certification expectations varied by position and 
even by person, with evaluators for some positions being more determined than others to identify a rigorous set of 
certification requirements.****
B. After the Columbia Accident 
 
When the shuttle program was initiated in 1972, flight controllers needed to be certified quickly to accommodate 
NASA’s original goal of 8 to 12 flights per year. The flight controllers learned a great deal during the first few 
shuttle flights. The shuttle capabilities and operating characteristics were continually under test. New information 
was acquired with each launch. Certification time (measured both in the number of simulations completed and in 
calendar time) was less than what it was in the latter half of the shuttle program.  
There were more training program changes after the Columbia accident in 2003. For the 10 years prior to the 
Columbia accident, the shuttle program budget had been steadily decreasing, with corresponding impacts on all 
organizations funded by the shuttle program office. Some initiatives for improving operations and training were not 
approved built due to cost. This situation was created in part because of the space station program. The space station 
was being built with no increase in the NASA budget, which meant cuts in other agency programs to fund the 
station. Without the necessary funding, improvements to flight controller training could not be implemented. After 
the Columbia accident, there were no simulations for several weeks. Once the simulations were started up again, the 
schedule became very busy. Multiple simulations were being held each day. Long simulations that simulated 
multiple flight days became more prevalent in training. This increase in simulations was viewed as a way to increase 
safety by the Columbia accident investigation review board. If the console teams trained more, then they would be 
better prepared to handle a problem that occurred during themission .††††
New standards were established to set simulation difficulty ratings and to define the maximum number of 
simulations allowed prior to certification, along with a difficulty rating for each simulation. The difficulty rating of 
the simulations had a scale of high, medium or low, and was based on the number of selected failures and actions 
required during the simulations. A threshold level was established for each subsystem, based on the historical 
average number of simulations needed to certify personnel within the previous 5 years. This numerical value is not 
consistent from group to group. If a console operator did not complete certification within the threshold, his or her 
group leader could appeal to management for additional simulation opportunities. The management team would then 
determine the additional number of simulations that would be allocated for the console operator to show 
  
                                                          
**** R. Dittemore, personal communication, April 4, 2011 
†††† W. Hale, personal communication, May 10, 2011 
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Table 2. Simulation ranking information criteria 
Simulation Ranking Number of criteria 
Low 0–7 criteria marked 
Medium 8–14 criteria marked 
High 15 or more criteria marked 
 
improvement before another final certification 
simulation would be scheduled for the 
individual. At the end of the simulation, the 
number of scenarios/failures that occurred 
during the simulation determined the rating 
assigned to the simulation. Table 2 specifies 
the levels of scenarios/failures that determined 
the difficulty rating for each simulation.  
V. Lessons Learned and Recommendations 
Many factors led to improvements in shuttle operator training: advances in technology, an expanding manifest 
with concurrent need for more efficient training methods, experience gained from shuttle accidents, and the 
operations experience gained by completing over one hundred missions. The following are lessons learned that have 
been identified by the Mission Operations Directorate. The corresponding recommendations are proposed by the 
authors, based on interviews and discussions with senior operators.  
A. Skills: Effective certification requires that individual flight controllers have the appropriate capabilities. 
In the early shuttle program, the skill set of a flight controller was evolving along with the maturity of the shuttle 
itself. It was not unusual for flight controllers to be selected based on engineering capabilities that were not directly 
applicable to the operations environment. Over the life of the shuttle program, there are many examples of 
individuals who left the Mission Operations Directorate for other jobs. In many cases certification requirements 
could not be met because the individual lacked the skills needed to perform on console. There is no data 
documenting this trend, but it is axiomatic in the flight controller working environment. While it is very difficult, it 
is important to try to select individuals with the skill set mentioned throughout this paper as early in the hiring and 
training phase as possible. This will give teams the greatest chance at successfully certifying personnel, and avoid 
sunken training costs.  
B. Feedback: Continuous constructive feedback is essential to flight controller success. 
Without receiving the necessary feedback, a flight controller in training does not know what skills need work or 
how to improve overall performance. This feedback role falls primarily on the group lead, who must make sure that 
the individual is progressing at the proper rate, and that the employee is receiving the right amount of feedback and 
encouragement from senior flight controllers as mentors and evaluators.  
Recommendation: A no-cost solution to this issue is to have more group leads or senior flight controllers 
observing trainees on every other simulation and provide real-time oral feedback. Feedback should be given on a 
regular basis so that bad habits are resolved more quickly. In addition, written feedback should be given within three 
days after each certification simulation. This practice has historically not been applied in the past.  
C. Training Strategy: Training of the flight controllers needs to be done efficiently. 
The years of not flying after the Columbia accident contributed to a change in the training strategy. The number 
of simulations was increased after the accident as a way to ensure more expertise and decision making from the 
console teams. Additionally, the training strategy required that each flight controller had to see every failure that 
could occur. This led to issues with scheduling “the right” failures in specific simulations. The simulations are 
scripted to address a specific test objective that the flight controller has to resolve. Normally there might be one or 
two failures per system in a noncertification simulation. Scheduling issues contributed as well to the length of time it 
took to certify. The organization attempted to solve this by creating ranking systems for simulations of high, 
medium, or low content. Only the high or medium simulations counted towards certification of  the individual in the 
training flow. This approach was started in 2007 and has been in place since that time. The amount of simulations 
varies on who needs to accomplish certain objectives and what positions need to be certified prior to flight.  
Another impact of long certification times is employee morale. Sometimes there would be two or three people 
waiting in a flow for a turn to get certified. It could take several years to even start participating in simulations. This 
was frustrating for new hires and trainees right out of college. Then taking a year or longer to get a certification 
added to the frustration; employees had difficulty seeing an opportunity to advance their careers in a reasonable 
timeframe.  In some cases the frustration could cause poor performance in the employee’s daily work. These issues 
might drive away qualified employees. Yet that is not true in all cases; some individuals love the work and are 
committed to it no matter how long it takes to advance. 
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Recommendation: One solution would be to use simulation technology at each employee’s workstation. 
Currently there is a Flight Controller Trainer (FCT) available to teach a class, usually once per week per trainee. The 
FCT is a workstation that is used to introduce malfunctions to new trainees; this amount of FCT usage is not enough 
to decrease certification time. An interactive software program for the trainee’s office workstation might decrease 
certification time.8 This software program would model failures, give options for solutions, and show the impact of 
the solution path selected. This would allow more access and training every day in the office and not require as 
much time in the control room. The cost to develop the tool is less than the cost of running hundreds of simulation. 
Time would be needed to develop the tool, but that is available at the end of the shuttle program. Technology is 
readily available to do this and could be done by private industry. This would help create a working relationship in 
the private training world.  
Recommendation: Revert back to a “skills-based” versus “task-based” certification of individuals, meaning they 
do not have to see every possible failure of a system, but learn to address various types of malfunctions and know 
how to systematically approach anomalies. In this approach, a trainee does not need a “check in every box” to be 
certified—a method that would definitely drive down certification time. While the data has not been analyzed to 
address the likelihood of success if trainees to not see every failure, this has already been implemented in the 
International Space Station flight controller training program. If this recommendation is accepted for future vehicles 
with ascent and entry phases, questions on qualification need to address failure recognition and resolution, and need 
to prove whether or not the trainee has the skills to support likely failure scenarios. Additionally, the interactive 
workstation software program discussed above could help cover some of the failures not seen by the individual. This 
would additionally reduce the cost as associated with many simulations needed by multiple individuals. 
D. Technology: The use of technology can aide in the reduction of cost. 
Another lesson learned is the degree to which technology development can affect operations. The costs 
associated with limited data availability in the original shuttle mission control were reduced when flight controllers 
moved to the new control center in the 1990s with its then state-of-the-art technology. That technology has since 
become dated and obsolete; in the new space vehicle development era, there are opportunities to explore a variety of 
mission control room models. Some companies suggest that a trailer filled with computers and operators would be 
sufficient. Others look to the models used by satellite operations controllers. Another model incorporates the large 
control rooms and teams used by the shuttle and space station. There are benefits and drawbacks to each of these 
options. In the current environment, with cost being the greatest driver, the technology that gives NASA the most 
capability, flexibility, and lowest cost will be the preferred option. Currently, the Mission Operations Directorate is 
building a new MCC and training System capability to apply state of the art technology and achieve these 
efficiencies.  
Technology is our greatest opportunity to ensure success as we go forward in the space program. It will help 
reduce cost by eliminating some of the work done today by people—just as it did when the shuttle program 
transitioned from the old to the new control center. Many commercial companies are trying to find the balance of 
new technology, minimal operations teams, and small control rooms. While NASA is not-for-profit, the agency can 
learn from the for-profit companies’ efforts to achieve the optimum balance; however, NASA also must learn from 
history how to balance technology and cost with risk and mission success.  
Consider the example of the airline industry in the 1930s. At that time there were many fledging airline carriers 
being formed. There were no operating standards, and many accidents occurred and people were killed. It was not 
until 1935, when an airline accident killed a sitting U.S. senator that questions were raised about safety. Eventually 
operating standards were created and these eventually led to the creation of what we know today as the Federal 
Aviation Administration. We can see that one accident of importance can change the industry and bring regulations 
and add process; and, of course, the improvements are likely to add cost and time to production. This happened in 
the space program after the Challenger and Columbia accidents, and could happen again in the revenue-conscious 
for-profit environment. One accident from one of the commercial companies could bring unwanted scrutiny, which 
in turn could result in expensive requirements. 
VI. Conclusion 
Over the 30-year space shuttle program, NASA has had many opportunities to improve flight controller training 
and certification. As the shuttle program comes to a close, the replacement vehicle has yet to be selected or 
designed. The uncertain future provides an opportunity to pause and reevaluate the flight controller training process. 
A review of the evolving STS certification requirements, the data collected and the lessons learned suggest 
recommendations that establish a foundation for developing an effective training program for the next space 
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transportation vehicle. Although we do not now know what requirements a new launch vehicle will place on mission 
operations, the shuttle-related recommendations are likely to be relevant in the post-shuttle environment; in 
particular, the need to address challenges related to cost is likely to remain. 
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